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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to consider the 
petition; 
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding a Family 
Settlement Agreement enforceable without formal court approval; 
and 
3. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding 
petitioners were not entitled to a jury determination of their 
equitable claims. 
REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL REPORT OF OPINION 
ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Matter of Estate of Grimm, 784 P.2d 1234 (Utah App. 1989). 
OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals did not enter its decision on December 
29, 1989, as petitioners assert. Rather, that Court entered its 
decision on December 20, 1989. See, official report of opinion, 
Matter of Estate of Grimm, 784 P.2d 1238 (Utah App. 1989).l 
Respite the December 20, 1989 decision date set forth in 
the official reporter, petitioners assert the decision was 
entered on December 29, 1989. As more fully discussed herein, 
December 29, 1989 was the date the Court of Appeals amended its 
opinion to correct a typographical error. Rule 45, however, 
makes no mention of "opinion" or "amended opinion" but speaks 
only in terms of "decision". An opinion might undergo many 
changes before final publication, but the decision date remains 
the same. There is no basis in the rules for petitioners' 
assumption that a change in the textual "opinion" after a 
decision is rendered tolls the time for filing a petition. 
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Although petitioners obtained an ex parte Order purporting 
to extend the time for filing to February 28, 1990, or 38 days 
past the prescribed time, Rule 45(e) of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court states in pertinent part: "No extension shall 
exceed 30 days past the prescribed time • . • ." The petition 
was finally filed on February 20, 1990, or 31 days past the 
prescribed time. Thus, the petition is jurisdictionally out of 
time.2 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. S 75-3-912: Private agreements among succes-
sors to decedent binding on personal representative. 
Subject to the rights of creditors and taxing 
authorities, competent successors may agree among 
themselves to alter the interests, shares, or amounts 
to which they are entitled under the will of the dece-
dent, or under the laws of intestacy, in any way that 
they provide in a written contract executed by all who 
are affected by its provisions. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. S 75-3-1101: Effect of approval of agreement 
involving trusts, inalienable interests, or interests of third 
persons. 
A compromise of any controversy as to admission to 
probate of any instrument offered for formal probate as 
the will of a decedent, the construction, validity, or 
effect of any probated will, the rights or interests in 
the estate of the decedent, any successor, or the 
administration of the estate, if approved in a formal 
proceeding in the court for that purpose, is binding on 
all the parties thereto, including those unborn, 
unascertained, or who could not be located• An 
approved compromise is binding even though it may 
affect a trust or an inalienable interest. . . . 
2Rule 45(b) states that the clerk will refuse any petition 
that is "jurisdictionally out of time." 
-2-
Utah Code Ann, S 75-3-1102: Procedure for securing court 
approval of compromise. 
(1) The procedure for securing court approval of a 
compromise is as follows: 
(a) The terms of the compromise shall be set 
forth in an agreement in writing which shall 
be executed by all competent persons . . . 
which will or may be affected by the com-
promise. Execution is not required by any 
person whose identity cannot be ascertained 
or whose whereabouts are unknown and cannot 
reasonably be ascertained. 
(b) Any interested person, including the personal 
representative of a trustee, then may submit 
the agreement to the court for its approval 
and for execution by the personal representa-
tive, the trustee of every affected testa-
mentary trust, and other fiduciaries and 
representatives. 
(c) After notice to all interested persons or 
their representatives, including the personal 
representative of the estate and all affected 
trustees of trust, the court, if it finds 
that the contest or controversy is in good 
faith and that the effect of the agreement 
upon the interest of the persons represented 
by fiduciaries or other representatives is 
just and reasonable, may make an order 
approving the agreement and directing all 
fiduciaries under its supervision to execute 
the agreement. . . . Upon the making of the 
order and the execution of the agreement, all 
further disposition of the estate is in 
accordance with the terms of the agreement. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
For purposes of opposing this petition, respondents do not 
contest petitioners' recitation of the procedural history of this 
consolidated action. Petitioners' Statement of Facts, however, 
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is largely irrelevant, and in any case does not present a proper 
background for purposes of the instant petition. 
For example, without arguing that the lower courts' findings 
were not supported by substantial evidence, petitioners include 
in their Statement of Facts much of the direct evidence contrary 
to the courts' findings without acknowledging the substantial 
evidence presented in support. Nevertheless, this Court must 
view the findings of the courts below favorably, and not sub-
stitute its own judgment except to prevent manifest injustice if 
the evidence clearly preponderates against those findings. Reid 
v. Mutual of Omaha, 776 P.2d 896, 899-900 (Utah 1989). Accord-
ingly, respondents adopt by this reference the Findings of Fact 
entered by the district court as set forth at Appendix 2 to the 
Petition, and those facts found by the Court of Appeals as set 
forth in Appendix 1. 
In addition, the following facts are of particular relevance 
to the issues presented: 
1. With respect to the first question presented, the 
"decision" of the Utah Court of Appeals was rendered on 
December 20, 1989, as set forth in the official report of that 
decision at 784 P.2d 1238. Although the "opinion" that was 
finally published had been amended to correct typographical 
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errors on December 29, 1989, the judgment of December 20, 1989 
was not changed or amended in any way.3 
2. The Petition for Writ of Certiorari at issue was filed 
with the Court on February 20, 1990, or 31 days after the pre-
scribed time for filing a petition. See Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals, No. 900082. 
3. To the extent facts relating to duress or failure of 
consideration are relevant to the second issue presented, the 
district court found the following: 
32. By January 31, 1978, Mr. Salisbury [a partner 
in the firm of Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
retained by Maxine] had been made aware by Maxine of an 
income tax case concerning Grimm's taxes pending before 
the U.S. Tax Court, Washington, D.C., which was being 
handled by Mr. Bert Rand for Grimm prior to Grimm's 
death. 
33. In January and February of 1978, Mr. 
Salisbury was informed and discussed with Maxine the 
fact that for Philippine estate tax purposes, the 
estate of non-citizen domiciliaries of the Philippines 
included all property of the deceased, real or per-
sonal, tangible or intangible, where ever situated, 
except real estate located outside the Philippines and 
that the tax was 60%. 
34. In January or February, 1978, Maxine retained 
a lawyer in the Philippine islands, Mr. Edgardo Angara. 
Mr. Salisbury and Mr. Angara exchanged telegrams and 
conversed by telephone about the numerous questions 
concerning the estate, including Grimm's domicile and 
the effect of Philippines domicile, the law of legitime 
by which children are compulsory heirs, and its effect 
on the trust, the civil doctrine of collation, the 
3The typographical error in the original opinion is found on 
page 10. Apparently, the subscript of footnote 9 was omitted 
from the text at the end of the second sentence of the first full 
paragraph of that page. 
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assets subject to taxation by the Philippines and the 
doctrine of renvoi as applied to succession from per-
sons having citizenship different from their domicile. 
At the time of Grimm's death, his estate, mostly 
personal property, was in excess of $8 million, with 
assets situated in the Philippines, in Hong Kong and in 
the United States. There were numerous questions to be 
resolved. Mr. Salisbury also corresponded with an 
attorney in Reno, Nevada, concerning the validity of 
Grimm's divorce and hence the validity of his marriage 
to Maxine. 
35. By February, 1978, Mr. Salisbury had con-
cluded that it might be an advantage to work out a 
settlement for tax purposes if the trust could be left 
intact. 
36. During March, 1978, Mr. Salisbury talked at 
least five times with Maxine about legal issues con-
cerning this estate and the possibility of settlement. 
Mr. Salisbury made calculations as to what Ethel and 
Nita might receive under various assumptions. Maxine 
told Mr. Salisbury that Ethel had presented the paper 
outlining a settlement proposal and he had asked her to 
sign it. Mr. Salisbury advised Maxine not to sign, and 
upon his advice, she did not do so. 
37. Maxine was agreeable to and desirous of 
entering into an agreement, but wanted it consummated 
in Utah under Mr. Salisbury's supervision and wanted to 
receive her one-half free of tax. 
39. In late February or early March, 1978, Ethel 
and Nita employed Mr. Donald Holbrook of Jones, Waldo, 
Holbrook and McDonough to represent their interests in 
Utah. Mr. Holbrook and others in his office and Mr. 
Salisbury and others in his office communicated over a 
period of several weeks. On April 4, 1978, Mr. 
Holbrook's office and Mr. Salisbury's office stipulated 
to the admission of the non-Philippine will to probate 
in Tooele County under certain conditions. Final 
negotiations, with Rex representing Ethel and Nita, and 
Pete representing Maxine and Linda, consumed at least 
five days, from April 20 through April 25, 1978. There 
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were at least four drafts of the first draft [of the 
Family Settlement Agreement] prepared by Mr. Salisbury. 
The final agreement was incorporated into two docu-
ments, the settlement agreement and the supplemental 
memorandum. 
40. During the negotiations each side presented 
points and proposals to advance the positions of their 
clients. Pete and Mr. Salisbury were insistent that 
the first wife, Juanita, sign the agreement to relin-
quish any claim she might have in the estate. During 
the negotiations it was agreed that Maxine receive a 
guaranteed minimum of $1,500,000 plus her two houses 
and certain bank accounts regardless of the eventual 
size of the estate. Pete and Mr. Salisbury also 
insisted that Maxine receive her share without reduc-
tion by way of death taxes. Negotiations also resulted 
in an agreement that Pete and Linda receive certain 
bank accounts and the Ethel and Nita be guaranteed a 
minimum. 
41. Mr. Salisbury communicated at least twice in 
April with Maxine. Pete conferred with Mr. Salisbury 
on a continual basis between April 17 and April 25, 
1978. On the morning prior to signing the family 
settlement agreement, Pete represented to Mr. Salisbury 
that he had discussed the agreement with his mother 
(Maxine) the night before and that she wanted to go 
ahead. 
42. The agreement was signed on April 25, 1978, 
by Pete and Linda, by Pete as attorney-in-fact for 
Maxine and by Rex as attorney-in-fact for Ethel and 
Nita. It was also signed by both attorneys. Subse-
quently, a copy was signed by Nita in California and by 
Ethel and Maxine in the Philippine islands. Pursuant 
to the family settlement agreement, Mr. Salisbury was 
retained as attorney for the estate to represent all of 
the "heirs." 
43. The family settlement agreement was not 
signed as a result of threats, duress or coercion. 
Maxine was represented by Mr. Salisbury who advised 
Mrs. Maxine Grimm that he had investigated the claims 
made by Nita and Ethel and she did not have to enter 
into a settlement agreement if she did not desire to do 
so. 
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47. Subsequent to the signing of the settlement 
agreement, all of the parties worked toward and pur-
suant to the agreement* 
52. On September 20/ 1978, Mr. Salisbury wrote to 
the beneficiaries again reaffirming the agreement. 
This letter is the first of a number of reports to the 
beneficiaries by Mr. Salisbury concerning the progress 
of the estate pursuant to the family settlement agree-
ment. At no time did Maxine, Pete or Linda take 
exception to any of the reports of Mr. Salisbury. 
54. Also in February, 1979, the U.S. estate tax 
return was signed by Maxine and filed. The estate tax 
issue was simplified and aided by the family settlement 
agreement in the opinion of Mr. Salisbury. Under the 
return, Maxine claimed the maximum marital deduction. 
56. On May 23, 1979, $800,000 of the Everett 
receivable was distributed in accordance with the 
family settlement agreement and in the percentages 
designated by the family settlement agreement: 
$400,000 to Maxine and $100,000 each to the four 
children. In addition, pearls and silver were dis-
tributed in accordance to the terms of the family 
settlement agreement. 
57. In September, 1979, the Philippine estate 
taxes were paid. Because there were not sufficient 
liquid funds to pay all of the estate taxes due, the 
shortfall was paid by the respective beneficiaries in 
accordance with their shares under the family settle-
ment agreement. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Petition at Appendix 2 
(citations omitted). 
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4. Each of the findings set forth above was upheld by the 
Court of Appeals as not against the clear weight of the evidence. 
See Matter of Estate of Grimm, 784 P.2d 1238, 1248 (Utah App. 
1989). 
5. With respect to the third issue raised by this peti-
tion, the procedural posture of the case is relevant. 
Petitioners filed their Complaint seeking rescission of the 
Family Settlement Agreement on numerous equitable grounds includ-
ing duress and failure of consideration. Respondents answered 
petitioners' Complaint contending that the Agreement was valid 
and enforceable, and filed a Counterclaim contending that in the 
alternative, if the Agreement was not specifically enforceable, 
petitioners had violated the terms of the Agreement thereby 
giving rise to a breach of contract claim. To this breach-
of-contract claim petitioners asserted affirmative defenses of 
duress and failure of consideration. 
The first issue to be decided by the district court was 
whether petitioners would prevail on their rescission claims or 
whether the Agreement could be enforced according to its terms. 
The court decided to enforce the Agreement. If the court had 
decided the Agreement could not be specifically enforced, then 
respondents would have sought a decision on their breach-of-
contract counterclaim. That decision would have been made by the 
jury, as would the decision as to whether duress or failure of 
consideration constituted a defense. However, when the district 
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court made its decision on the equitable claims, there was no 
need for any decision, by the court or jury, on respondent's 
legal counterclaim, or on petitioners' affirmative defenses 
thereto. The statement of the district court before trial 
contained in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari must be examined 
in this procedural context: 
Therefore, I grant you the benefit of having a 
jury trial, but so that everybody understands, the 
court will make the decision as to whether or not the 
family settlement agreement is valid or invalid, and 
then based upon that you may proceed on your counter-
claim — you may not proceed, but at that time the 
plaintiffs here cannot say that they didn't have the 
right for the jury to hear all of the defenses with 
regard to coercion, duress and other defenses. . . . 
(Tr. at 22.) 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST ISSUANCE OF A WRIT 
1. The Petition for Writ of Certiorari at issue is luris-
dictionally out of time. 
To achieve finality after an already lengthy appellate 
review process, the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court require that 
a petition for writ of certiorari be filed within thirty (30) 
days after "decision" by the Court of Appeals. Rules of Utah 
Supreme Court, Rule 45 (1987).4 The Rules go on to provide that 
in special circumstances, particularly "upon a showing of excus-
able neglect of good cause," the time for filing a petition may 
4As noted at Note 1, supra, the Rules make no mention of 
"opinion" or "amended opinion" but begin the running of the time 
period at the date of "decision." 
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be extended "not later than thirty days" beyond the original 
thirty day period. Id. However, the Rules specifically state 
"no extension shall exceed thirty days past the prescribed time 
or ten days from the date of the entry of the order granting the 
motion, whichever occurs later." Id. 
In this case, the Utah Court of Appeals entered its decision 
on December 20, 1989. See, official report of opinion, Matter of 
Estate of Grimm, 784 P.2d 1238 (Utah App. 1989).5 The time 
prescribed for filing any petition for writ of certiorari was 
thus thirty days later, on January 19, 1990. 
On January 3, 1990, petitioners filed an §x parte Motion for 
Extension of Time to File Petition For a Writ of Certiorari, 
seeking the maximum 30 day enlargement allowed by the Rules. 
Pursuant to that motion, petitioners obtained an ex parte Order 
extending the time from January 19, 1990, to February 19, 1990. 
See Order Granting Plaintiffs-Appellants' Ex Parte Motion for 
Extension of Time to File Petition for Writ of Certiorari, dated 
January 3, 1990. 
Nevertheless, on or about January 4, 1990, petitioners filed 
an Amended Ex Parte Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition 
Consistent with this date of "decision", Rule 30(c) of the 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals provides that "entry by the 
clerk in the records of the court shall constitute the entry of 
judgment of the court." Clearly, a subsequent change in the text 
of an opinion in no way altered the court's judgment entered as 
of December 20, 1989. 
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for Writ of Certiorari, requesting additional time up to and 
including February 28, 1990, or 38 days past the prescribed time. 
As the sole grounds for the additional extension, petitioners 
stated in their motion that the Court of Appeals had entered an 
amended opinion, and "although the amended opinion is not 
substantively different from the original opinion, plaintiff/ 
appellants schedule is such and the issues involved in this 
appeal are such that they need as much additional time as pos-
sible to prepare and file a petition," See, Amended Ex Parte 
Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition For Writ of 
Certiorari, filed January 4, 1990. 
Significantly, however, there is no basis in the language of 
the Supreme Court rules or otherwise for the eight days requested 
beyond the original thirty-day extension. The rules specifically 
state that the period begins to run on the date the "decision" is 
entered, without any references to the opinion or whatever 
technical amendments to the opinion might be necessary. See 
Rules of Utah Supreme Court, Rule 45 (1987). The rules go on to 
provide "no extension shall exceed thirty days past the pre-
scribed time or ten days from the date of entry of the Order 
granting the motion, whichever occurs later." Id. 
Subsequent amendments to the text of the "opinion" notwith-
standing, the "decision" in this case was entered on December 20, 
1989. Thus, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari at issue, filed 
February 20, 1990, was filed thirty-one (31) days past the 
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prescribed time, and under the rules of this Court is jurisdic-
tionally out of time, 
2- The Court of Appeals did not err in holdina a Family 
Settlement Agreement was enforceable without formal 
court approval. 
Petitioners argue at length that Certiorari is necessary 
here because petitioners disagree with the Court of Appeals' 
reading of SS 75-3-1101 and 75-3-1102 of the Utah Code, and with 
the Court of Appeals' reading of this Court's decision in The 
Matter of the Estate of Frank Chasel, 725 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1986). 
Petitioners' disagreement, however, in no way makes the Court of 
Appeal's reading of the applicable statutes or case law incor-
rect, and the Petition should be denied. 
For example, petitioners argue that § 75-3-1101 requires 
court approval of a compromise settlement agreement before the 
agreement has any legal effect. See Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, at pp. 12-14. However, neither that section, nor its 
legislative history, even reach the issue of whether a compromise 
agreement, entered into by competent adults represented by 
counsel and after extensive negotiation, but which has not been 
formally approved, has legal effect. Rather, that section deals 
with the effect of court approval under certain circumstances 
once it has been obtained: 
Effect of approval of agreements involving trusts, 
inalienable interests, or interests of third persons. 
A compromise of any controversy . . . if approved in a 
formal proceeding in the court for that purpose is 
binding on all of the parties thereto. . . . An 
approved compromise is binding even though it may have 
effect the trust or inalienable interest. 
Utah Code Ann. S 75-3-1101 (1975). 
In fact, to read § 75-3-1101 as requiring court approval of 
all agreements, rather than stating the effect of such approval 
under certain circumstances, would be inconsistent with S 75-3-
912. That section by its terms governs private agreements, and 
states as follows: 
Subject to the rights of creditors and taxing 
authorities, competent successors may agree among 
themselves to alter the interests, shares, or amounts 
to which they are entitled under the will of the dece-
dent, or under the laws of intestacy, in any way that 
they provide in a written contract executed by all who 
are affected by its provisions. 
Utah Code Ann. S 75-3-912 (1975).6 
Interpreting § 75-3-1101 as simply stating the effect of 
approval without requiring approval is consistent with the only 
case cited by counsel which resolves the precise issue presented 
under a similar statutory scheme, In re Pecks Estate. 34 N.W.2d 
533 (Mich. 1948). The court there stated: 
It was not necessary to secure the consent of the 
probate court to the settlement as there were no minors 
or unknown heirs involved. The courts encourage set-
tlements where there is no fraud or mistake and the 
parties are of age, particularly so where there is a 
6This section does not require that any compromise agreement 
be submitted to probate court for approval before it has legal 
effect. 
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full understanding of the provisions in the settlement 
and the parties are represented by able counsel. 
34 N.W.2d, at 538. 
By contrast, petitioners rely upon their own novel inter-
pretation of In re Estate of Chasel, 725 P.2d 1345, 1348 (Utah 
1986), for the proposition that section 1101 requires approval of 
a settlement agreement before it has any effect. In Chasel, 
however, the settlement agreement at issue had been approved by 
the court. The Supreme Court, consistent with § 75-3-1101, 
simply stated that "if approved in a formal proceeding in the 
court for that purpose [a compromise agreement] is binding on all 
the parties thereto." The Court simply did not decide the issue 
present here, whether an unapproved compromise agreement between 
competent adults is binding, and thus its statement relied on by 
petitioners is, as stated by the Court of Appeals, dictum.7 
Petitioners also argue in this regard that the Court of 
Appeals was mistaken to hold that the compromise agreement at 
issue was enforceable in spite of a spendthrift trust provision: 
The FSA was either subject to the court approval 
requirements of SS 1101 and 1102 and therefore not 
binding prior to court approval or it was not subject 
to the court approval provisions of SS 1101 and 1102 
and therefore invalid and void from its inception 
because it materially altered and terminated a spend-
7And it is not at all clear, as petitioners assert, that the 
parties in Chasel would have been able to alter the agreement at 
issue if it had not been approved by the court. See, Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari, at p. 16. That is, in fact, the com-
pletely different issue presented by this case. 
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thrift trust. The Court of Appeals cannot have it both 
ways. 
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at p. 17. 
Petitioners are incorrect, however, because the Family 
Settlement Agreement was a legally binding document with or 
without court approval. There was nothing that made the Agree-
ment invalid and void from its inception. When, through the 
course of this lawsuit, the parties went through all of the 
procedures necessary to obtain court approval pursuant to 
§ 75-3-1102 and the court saw fit to approve the Agreement, 
pursuant to § 75-3-1101 petitioners cannot complain that it is 
invalid for affecting a spendthrift trust provision. Thus, as 
stated by the Court of Appeals: 
We have found the FSA to be a valid contract, even 
without court approval. However, the trial court in 
its judgment approved the FSA. Under S 75-3-1101 it is 
thus binding, even though it may affect a trust or 
inalienable interest. 
784 P.2d, at 1245. 
3. The Court of Appeals did not err in denvina petitioners 
a jury trial on their equitable causes of action. 
The only legal cause of action presented in petitioners' 
Complaint was a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court denied 
plaintiffs a jury trial on this issue when it decided the Family 
Settlement Agreement was valid and enforceable and dismissed the 
jury. See, 784 P.2d, at 1248. 
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Petitioners also argue, however, that they were denied a 
right to a jury trial on the issues of duress and failure of 
consideration. "Once Respondents asserted the breach of contract 
counterclaim and proceeded to trial on that claim. Petitioners 
had a constitutional right to a jury trial on the issues of 
duress and failure of consideration." See, Petition for a Writ 
Certiorari, at p. 19. 
Petitioners' argument, however, ignores the procedural 
posture of this case and the issues actually presented to the 
court for resolution. At the close of the evidence when the 
district court determined petitioners' equitable rescission 
claims against them, there was no need for any decision to be 
made on respondents' legal breach of contract claim, and thus no 
need for any jury determination of either the legal claim or the 
affirmative defenses to the claim. As the Court of Appeals 
stated "such affirmative defenses became moot." 784 P.2d at 
1246. Simply put, petitioners were not denied a jury determina-
tion of any issue that were not equitable except their claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Nor is this Court's holding in International Harvester 
Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor and Implement, Inc.. 626 P.2d 418 
(Utah 1981), to the contrary. International Harvester simply 
holds that Utah Constitution, Article I, S 10 is unambiguous in 
guaranteeing a right to trial by jury. But that case in no way 
entitles any claimant to a jury trial of equitable issues. See 
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e.g., Coleman v. Dillman, 624 P.2d 713 (Utah 1981) and Bradshaw 
v, Kershaw, 529 P.2d 803 (Utah 1974). 
CONCLUSION 
After an already lengthy appellate review, the Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari at issue should be denied by this Court 
because it is jurisdictionally out of time. Even if the Petition 
were not out of time, the decision of the Court of Appeals was in 
no way erroneous and does not require additional appellate review 
by this Court. Thus respondents respectfully request that the 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari be denied. 
DATED this 30 day of March, 1990. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
R. Brent Stephens 
Robert C. Keller 
Attorneys for Respondents 
RCK436 
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